Publication Details

25 November 2024 

On October 17, the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed the death of Yahya Sinwar[i], a senior leader of Hamas and the architect behind the recent October 7 attack. Sinwar’s role held both practical and symbolic weight, amplifying the strategic implications of his assassination for Hamas’s organizational stability, the regional conflict, and the fate of over 100 hostages still held by the group.[i] His death reignites the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of the decapitation strategy in counterterrorism—whether eliminating a key leader can weaken or dismantle a resilient, ideologically driven organization like Hamas.

Decapitation Strategy: Concept and Expectations

Decapitation strategy is founded on the theory that removal of a terrorist group’s leader will destabilize and weaken the group. For states, victory in a “war on terror” often focuses on diminishing the influence and operational capacity of these non-state actors. Terrorism has long been a tactic of the weaker against the stronger, serving as both a strategy and ideology spanning centuries and cultures. Groups that adopt terrorism often choose a clandestine approach that complicates efforts to gauge their power, progress, or decline. In this covert context, the figurehead of the organization often emerges as a symbol of the group’s struggle, embodying its ideological persistence and resilience.[ii]

The survival of a group leader(ship) is frequently perceived as a testament to the group’s success and endurance, whereas leadership removal by capture or death can signal symbolic, if not practical, decline. Decapitation strategy then rests on the presumption that removal of key individuals will destabilize and demoralize the group, disrupting its continuity. States assume that the pool of leaders with the necessary skills and ideological commitment is limited; therefore, targeting these individuals will deplete the organization’s resources, lead to fragmentation, and ultimately defeat it. This strategy anticipates that, without a unifying leader, the organization will suffer reduced effectiveness, weakened morale, and impaired operational capacity, eventually leading to group collapse.

Tactical Gains and Strategic Uncertainties

The Israeli Defence Forces have killed dozens of publicly identified key Hamas leaders since 7 October 2023[iii]; most notably Mohammed Deif, Hamas military leader in Gaza and Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas political leader, and Sinwar. The loss of these, and a significant portion of the field level leadership[iv], has forced Hamas to abandon their traditional paramilitary organization and tactics for a more guerrilla organization and resistance[v]. Hamas has been able to infiltrate areas that have previously been cleared but they appear uncoordinated and are a limited threat. Thus, it appears that Hamas, while still being capable of conducting low level sporadic operations, it is unable to coordinate and thus poses a manageable threat to Isreal forces and population. Thus, on a tactical level the strategy appears to have work

One of the most successfully examples of applying decapitation strategy is the capture of, the founder and leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992[vi]. Guzmán’s arrest largely ended the group, which, just two years previously, was on the brink of overthrowing the Peruvian government. Other cases illustrate the limitations of decapitation, especially when leaders hold symbolic power that endures after they die. The tracking and killing of Bolivian revolutionary Che Guevara in the 1960s did little to diminish his appeal. Decades later, his image remains a global symbol of radical politics, surpassing any tangible success he realized during his lifetime. In the same vein, the killing of Osama Bin Laden had little impact on the operations or ideological momentum of the broader Al-Qaeda movement. These examples illustrate how the effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a stand-alone strategy relies on aspects of the group structure and the symbolic importance of the leader.

Risks in Targeting Established Organizations        

Decapitation can be particularly successful when targeting established terror groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda and the IRA. These are organisations with structure, leadership, succession, and internal systems accumulated over decades that enable them to survive the death of a senior leader. They’ve established a veteran team who can take the reins and minimise disruption. Older organizations often contain factions whose strategic and ideological interests are hard to alter, and the turnover of leadership is asymmetrical. Counterterrorism tactics involved dismembering leaders to alter the inner harmony, subvert a mob’s policy or break its unity. This strategy requires specific information on how the group is organised (and who could be its next leader), and these are notoriously hard to come by. Misunderstandings can have unexpected repercussions, such as creating space fore even more radical leadership. In some cases, states may decide it is more advantageous to maintain known leaders rather than risk destabilizing the organization in unpredictable ways.

The British government, for instance, didn’t target IRA leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, knowing that they were people with whom they could regularly communicate and, in the end, negotiate. Occasionally, the UK even stood up to defend them from rival groups, appreciating the certainty and stability their leadership brought. This "Devil You Know" dynamic reflects the fact that decapitation is never a smart option, particularly if it will create new and potentially extreme or uncontrollable forces in the organisation following a leader’s ouster.

The US and Israel are among the most prolific practitioners of the decapitation method, but with varying outcomes. Tactically, decapitation does work: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, was killed in 2017, destroying the group’s bomb-making capability. In Iraq and Afghanistan, American troops experienced a short-term reduction in local insurgent violence following the targeted elimination of key personnel. Yet, despite these tactical advantages, neither war ended with explicit victory, demonstrating the limitations of decapitation as a strategy. This tactic, known as the "Whack-a-Mole" tactic, has historically placed eliminating leaders above a political or diplomatic objective, creating a revolving door of authority without a clear end to the conflict.

The Israeli experience has likewise served to highlight the potential and shortcomings of decapitation. For instance, the execution in 2015 of ISIS’s finance chief Abu Sayyaf undermined the organisation’s finance systems. But such decisions diminish organisations’ operational efficiency in the short run, but not their long-term political frustration or sustainability. Israel’s treatment of Hamas leadership prior to the 7 October attack was meant to discredit the armed resistance in hopes that a defeated and broken Hamas would not be so open to attack. 

Potential for Radicalization and Fragmentation

The targeted killing of Yahya Sinwar is a continuation of long-standing Israeli counterterrorism policy of destabilizing organizations by targeting terrorist group leadership. History has demonstrated that decapitation strategy, however disruptive, may have unintended consequences. The approach to leadership decapitation risks strengthening factional divisions and freeing radical elements.[ii] The death of Sinwar may only temporarily paralyse Hamas while making any future negotiations harder because of organisational fragmentation. Decapitation strategy may serve some immediate tactical goals on the field but can also end a chance of long-term stabilisation and peace.

The 1988 targeting of Abu Jihad, a senior Fatah and PLO military leader, in Tunis, may have halted some PLO direct actions, fuel internal strife and undermine its bargaining power.[vii] However, it also fragmented the organisation, inflaming militant factions and closing potential for negotiations. Similarly, the removal of Sinwar from the field may have opened the door to radicalisation and embolden those that resist negotiation in favour of war by promoting a next generation of leadership without the temperament for negotiation.

Sinwar’s death also exposes the vulnerabilities of Hamas’s so-called “hotel leadership”—senior figures who live out of Gaza in the relative safety of Doha and Beirut. These officials may have difficulty demonstrating power and authority in the eyes of fighters and citizens who live day-to-day in Gaza. The "hotel leadership" lacks Sinwar’s authority and local visibility so it’s not clear that they can lay claim to lead Hamas. This was a parallel to the PLO’s disintegration following Abu Jihad’s death, when the absence of a strong leader had undermined efforts to show unity. Without a figurehead, Hamas might suffer from more factionalism and open the door for radicals to escalate violence instead of compromise.

Preliminary Assessment and Strategic Takeaways

It is crucial to recognize that Hamas as an organization remains intact[viii]. Though battered and besieged, the organisation still has a limited operating capability and could still rally around surviving leaders or powerful players overseas. This fact points to the partial endorsement of decapitation policy here: Sinwar’s assassination destabilises leadership, but not Hamas. The perception of leadership decapitation as a successful strategy may well be dependent, ultimately, on whether the remaining Israeli hostages are released safely and whether broader political solutions address the source of the conflict.

Sinwar’s killing reveals not only the potential benefits but also the inherent limitations of decapitation as a counterterrorism technique. Assassinating a senior leader such as Sinwar erodes Hamas’s unity and can even throw its internal machinery into disarray, but we don’t know how it will affect them in the long run. Such effects might be counteracted by the group’s durability and ability to regroup, meaning that decapitation will never bring peace.

The Yahya Sinwar case reminds countries focused on this option that decapitation must be an aspect of a wider, multi-tiered counterterrorism strategy. As a strategy, it can yield powerful symbolic and tactical victories, but long-term security and stability will require dealing with the political and social forces that maintain such communities. Leadership decapitation, although in part effective, is merely one option to a tangled counterterrorism puzzle.

[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/17/israeli-military-says-it-may-have-killed-hamas-leader-yahya-sinwar

[ii]  Jordan, J. (2019). Hypotheses on Leadership Decapitation. In Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations (1st ed., pp. 47–61). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqsdmfh.

[iii] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/israeli-assassinations-top-hamas-and-hezbollah-officials

[iv] https://acleddata.com/2024/10/06/after-a-year-of-war-hamas-is-militarily-weakened-but-far-from-eliminated/

[v] https://acleddata.com/2024/10/06/after-a-year-of-war-hamas-is-militarily-weakened-but-far-from-eliminated/

[vi] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA515608

[vii] https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/135381

[viii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckrr0e3y29po