Publication Details

16 January 2025

Since Donald Trump’s election in November, leaders worldwide have scrambled to anticipate how and where United States policy will change. A shift in direction could have particularly big consequences for Africa, where several concurrent conflicts are raging. Conflicts in countries such as Somalia, Mozambique, and Central African Republic were ongoing during the first Trump administration, but the map of Africa in 2025 looks quite different from the one in 2021. U.S. and Europe forces are no longer present in several Sahelian countries, Sudan is in the middle of a gruesome civil war, terrorism across the continent grew, and tensions in the Horn are high even after the end of the Tigray War in 2022. How will the return of Trump affect these conflict dynamics?

Analyses of Trump’s foreign policy tend to start and end with the term “transactional.” Analysts use the term to argue that the U.S. will abandon its commitments to aid and development assistance, or to claim that it will bring a needed level of realpolitik to foreign policy.[1] African experts take a more nuanced view of the incoming administration’s likely actions. Christopher Isike and Samuel Oyewole note that Trump’s return “could be positive for foreign relations, investment and trade with some African countries. But … it could be bad for democracy, stability, commitment to human rights and climate change.”[2]

It would be a mistake to expect total consistency from the incoming President. As with Trump’s first term, it is difficult to judge what is rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences and what is conviction. If this second administration has as high a turnover of senior officials as the first, it will struggle to focus on issues at the periphery of American interests, which African security currently is. This article will discuss his likely approach to broad security issues, then discuss the implications for several African conflicts.

The big issues: peacekeeping, power politics, and privatization

The first Trump administration was less committed to aid and assistance, and African security issues were not a major priority compared to issues such as NATO contributions and confronting Iran. It was nearly two years into his term before Trump’s team put forward an Africa Strategy that tried to consolidate the “America First” view into a set of policies.[3] Even if Trump doesn’t have a formal Africa strategy until late 2025, the administration’s view of peacekeeping, power politics, and privatization has implications for the continent’s conflicts.

The Trump administration will very likely argue against continuing some of Africa’s longstanding peacekeeping missions based on expense. American financial commitments to the United Nations are steep compared to other member states. Trump’s UN Envoy in 2017, Nikki Haley, argued that major peacekeeping missions were costing too much and not producing the results the U.S. wanted.[4] In the intervening years the withdrawal of UN missions in Darfur and Mali have shown that these missions, while costly, are important to keeping conflicts from escalating. Opposition to multilateralism could be a big problem for the security of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where several overlapping missions are present. African regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and bilateral partners such as Rwanda and Russia struggle to do the same job, leaving the continent’s security worse off if the administration makes cost-cutting a priority.

Great power competition in Africa is much more important to the Trump administration than peacekeeping. In countries such as DRC, which has large amounts of mineral wealth, agreements can touch on conflict dynamics by offering support or security assistance. However, it is likely that geopolitical rivalries will pull U.S. focus away from security matters and they will mostly focus on economic relationships like trade with countries such as Angola and South Africa, which are less affected by conflict.

Trump’s focus on economic dealmaking over security assistance highlights that reduced engagement by the U.S. government is not the same as reduced engagement with U.S. businesses. A Trump administration might give business a freer hand, particularly for activities too controversial for more mainstream policymakers. Resource extraction companies stand to benefit, as do security contractors, despite competition from Turkish, Russian, and Chinese firms. Many American businesses in Africa hire contractors to provide security for their work and will also lobby the Trump administration to support policies that favor them. On issues where the Trump administration has no firm view, they may default to pursuing the interests of American businesses.

Implications for Africa’s Conflicts: The Sahel

The Sahel’s faltering battle with terrorism has several consequences for African security. Extremist groups are challenging states such as Mali and Burkina Faso and are now destabilizing coastal West African nations such as Benin and Ghana. Millions of civilians in the region are internally displaced or seeking refuge in countries such as Chad.[5] In the last four years, the governments of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have had military coups and jettisoned help from the UN, European Union, U.S., and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) in favor of forming an Alliance of Sahel States (AES by its French acronym). The AES has pursued closer engagement with Russia and strengthened ties with Turkey and Iran.[6] Russian contractors and paramilitaries have proven unable to stabilize the situation.

Trump will have extremely limited options to bring AES back into the fold. His administration’s response to the spiraling crisis may have some continuities with the Biden administration, which chose to increase engagement with the coastal West African nations in the hopes that they could at least contain the violence.[7] Administration officials might also bite the bullet and increase engagement with the military governments to degrade terrorism, even if that means sacrificing a return to democratic governance and benefitting Russian forces. The administration might take such action in Chad, which is becoming unaligned but not necessarily unfriendly. However, since the Sahel’s junta governments are unlikely to request a  large U.S. presence and restore its access to airbases across the region, an American return to the region has little hope of turning the tide against extremism.

The Horn

The Horn of Africa has several overlapping security risks including Ethiopia’s internal conflicts, Somalia’s counterterrorism woes, and the enduring spat between Somalia and Ethiopia over Somaliland. Reports that Somali terrorist organization Al Shabaab is engaging with the Houthi movement in Yemen adds another dimension of U.S. interest.[8]

Despite the bloody conflict between the Ethiopian government and Fano rebels from the Amhara region, Trump is unlikely to take much action on the country’s internal conflicts so long as it doesn’t affect relations with Addis Ababa. Somalia is a different matter. The first Trump administration may repeat the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia that they ordered in 2020.[9] Even if U.S. forces leave, however, the need to counter Al Shabaab will keep the U.S. engaged, as they will have to launch operations from neighboring countries or give more leeway to contractors to provide security services. Somaliland’s push for independence may complicate matters. There are rumors that Trump and many potential appointees are supportive of Somaliland’s autonomy, which would be welcomed by Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates, who have made bilateral agreements with the aspiring nation. However, support for Somaliland would annihilate relations with Somalia and upset countries such as Egypt and Turkey, who are major supporters of Somalia’s unity.[10]  

Sudan

Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the government, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and its former paramilitary ally, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is a disaster for the country’s population and regional security. Recently the government has made several advances against the RSF, though they are a long way from outright victory.[11]

The Trump administration is not likely to support the RSF, but support for Burhan is not guaranteed either. Many regional actors are skeptical of his leadership and could lobby against him with administration officials. Sudan’s government has recently moved to allow a long-planned Russian naval base. With no real interest in reestablishing a peacekeeping mission, Trump is more likely to focus on containing the damage and maintaining relations with other parties like Chad and Egypt than put his thumb on the scale.

Mozambique

Mozambique’s counterterrorism fight is a longstanding issue challenge. The country’s major extremist group is in the country’s north, close to major resource extraction sites. A revolving door of external forces, such as the Wagner Group, Dyck Advisory Group, Rwanda, and a multinational SADC force, have not been able to end the conflict.[12] Mozambique is also in the midst of significant unrest after a contested election this year that could divert the attention of security services.

Unless protests drive President Filipe Nyusi out of office entirely, the Trump administration will likely support the incumbent. Nyusi publicly congratulated Trump shortly after his victory, and Mozambique was a notable part of the first Trump administration’s “Prosper Africa” initiative.[13] Trump’s officials may judge that maintaining support for Mozambique and Rwanda, whose forces are deployed in the country’s north, is more important than pushing for fairer elections and stopping violence against protestors.

Cameroon

Cameroon’s simmering conflict between the government and a loose coalition of rebel groups (broadly referred to as “Anglophone”) in the country’s north did not draw much of Trump’s attention during his first term, even after President Paul Biya deployed U.S.-trained Cameroonian forces against them in 2018.[14] However, if Biya’s rumored health problems affect his leadership in the coming years, the crisis could turn into a regional catastrophe that empowers nonstate actors and terrorist organizations in the Lake Chad region.

Should Biya leave power, rebel groups would not find much sympathy from the Trump administration. Washington would almost certainly favor the solution it considers the most superficially stable. This would likely help neuter attempts to re-democratize the state and dismantle Cameroon’s patronage systems. However, U.S. support will be limited and only have a marginal impact on whether Biya’s successor can contain decades of internal grievances.

Conclusion

Trump will have no single answer to the myriad different kinds of conflicts affecting Africa. Some are at the margins of U.S. interest while others are important enough to draw in U.S. forces and resources. As terrorist groups spread and several key African leaders enter their later years, Trump may find more and more conflicts on the continent demanding his administration’s attention.

[1] Yinka Adegoke, “Trump’s Africa Plans Take Pragmatic Turn | Semafor,” Semafor, November 9, 2024, sec. africa, https://www.semafor.com/article/11/01/2024/trumps-africa-plans-take-pragmatic-turn-for-election.

[2] Christopher Isike and Samuel Oyewole, “Donald Trump Will Put America First: What Does That Mean for Africa?” The Conversation, November 22, 2024, http://theconversation.com/donald-trump-will-put-america-first-what-does-that-mean-for-africa-244050.

[3] “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy – The White House,” accessed December 2, 2024, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.

[4] Colum Lynch McCormick Ty, “Nikki Haley Threatened to Withhold Backing for U.N.’s Congo Mission, Then Blinked,” Foreign Policy (blog), December 12, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/nikki-haley-threatened-to-withhold-backing-for-u-n-s-congo-mission-then-blinked/.

[5] “Situation Sahel Crisis,” accessed November 26, 2024, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis.

[6] Raphael Parens, Christopher Faulkner, and Marcel Plichta, “The US May Have Lost the Sahel—But Russia Is No Savior,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 3, 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/10/the-us-may-have-lost-the-sahel-but-russia-is-no-savior/.

[7] U. S. Embassy Cotonou, “U.S. Government Supports Benin Armed Forces in Their Border Security Mission,” U.S. Embassy in Benin, November 29, 2023, https://bj.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-supports-benin-armed-forces-in-their-border-security-mission/.

[8] “Letter Dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council” (United Nations, October 11, 2024), https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf.

[9] “Trump Orders Withdrawal of US Troops from Somalia,” BBC News, December 4, 2020, sec. US & Canada, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130.

[10] “Trump Set to Recognise African State as Official Country, Says Ex-Tory Minister,” The Independent, November 19, 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/trump-somaliland-new-country-gavin-williamson-b2648376.html.

[11] Communications ACLED, “Turning the Tide: The SAF’s Strategic Offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s Setbacks - Sudan October 2024,” ACLED (blog), October 14, 2024, https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024/.

[12] “Mozambique Conflict: Is It Too Early to Withdraw Sadc Forces?” BBC News, June 18, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8vvr251rr5o.

[13] Moz editor, “Mozambique: Nyusi Congratulates Trump on US Election Win,” Mozambique, accessed November 26, 2024, https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-nyusi-congratulates-trump-on-us-election-win-270278/.

[14] Ryan Browne, “US Military Continues to Support Cameroon’s Military despite US Accusations of Targeted Killings | CNN Politics,” CNN, June 1, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/01/politics/us-cameroon-military-support/index.html.