Publication Details

15 October 2024

“To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.” –

George Washington, 1790, First State of the Union

Introduction

Since Russia’s Operation Z against Ukraine, warfare has moved from the theoretical employment of massed troops and equipment to the actual deployment of massed formations.

For years, Western forces have maintained what can be called ‘boutique armed forces.’[1] These consist of complex multirole equipment across all three military services, allowing one platform to undertake various roles.

In years past, military roles were highly specialised. Specific platforms required multiple single-use platforms to achieve tactical or operational effects, necessitating more operators and support personnel. Because single-use platforms were built for one role, their simpler systems kept costs low.[2] This favoured countries with large populations or industrial plants capable of high-volume production. During the Cold War (1947-91), the miniaturisation of electronics allowed gradual ‘multiroling’ of platforms. Armoured vehicles and ships could perform various offensive and defensive missions; fighter aircraft could perform air-to-air, reconnaissance, and air-to-ground missions, usually at the flick of a switch.

During an age where massed conventional warfare was largely thought obsolete, fewer platforms were needed because they possessed ‘mass effects,’ achieving mass-like outcomes through technology rather than numerical superiority.[3] However, countries like Russia and North Korea still relied on conventional mass.[4] Russian military history is replete with examples of conventional mass effectively repelling foreign enemies. The Korean War (1950-53), while limited due to fears of nuclear escalation, was also a war based on mass.

For Western military force structures, in order to counter the superior military mass of states like the USSR, China and North Korea, they focussed on technological innovation and multiroled systems.[5] But this meant that these force structures shrank in size over time for three main reasons:

1. The more versatile a platform, the fewer were needed, reducing the personnel base.

2. Ever-increasing technology levels in modern weapons exponentially increased their cost. Consequently, countries could afford fewer, adding to international ‘military shrinkage.’

3. As ‘mass warfare’ was considered over, governments had to do more with smaller forces. Defence during relative global peace is costly. The U.S. and its allies adapted by pooling military assets and personnel through coalition-building. Of Western allies, only the United States retained comprehensive manufacturing capabilities to independently scale weapon production. No European country, perhaps except for France and Russia, could imitate the U.S. in this regard.

The other primary driver limiting countries’ military capabilities was consolidating national armament companies. Consolidation meant fewer Prime companies in the international market, reducing competition.[6] Significant companies could charge whatever they liked for military products without competition, prioritising profit for executives and shareholders. Consolidation also meant fewer industrial plants, limiting military production to fewer areas.[7] Supply chains became critical for global companies to export and support their products throughout their life-of-type. Consequently, countries outside the U.S., France, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China saw their national defence production capacities dry up, making them dependent on senior allies or the international arms market.

However, there were exceptions.

Strategic Independence

Strategic independence in defence is crucial for nations aiming to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and enhance national security. Developing local weapons manufacturing capabilities provides significant strategic advantages. Case studies of nations like Sweden, Israel, and South Korea illustrate the benefits of autonomous defence industries.

Strategic independence historically provided Sweden with advantages, maintaining neutrality and avoiding entanglements in conflicts that did not directly affect its national interests.[8] This policy of non-alignment allowed Sweden to focus on domestic development, fostering strong institutions and a resilient economy without costly military alliances. Sweden’s strategic independence enhanced its diplomatic credibility, enabling it to mediate international disputes and promote regional peace and stability. This stance safeguarded Sweden’s sovereignty and contributed to its unique soft power, characterised by human rights and global cooperation. How the country’s decision to join NATO on April 4, 2023, will affect its national defence industries remains to be seen.[9]

With its advanced military technology sector, Israel achieved self-sufficiency, enabling rapid adaptation and innovation in arms production tailored to its security needs.[10] Similarly, South Korea transformed its defence capabilities from reliance on international aid to becoming a major global arms exporter, bolstering its geopolitical stature and economic stability.[11] These examples highlight the strategic benefits of cultivating robust, independent defence industries, which fortify national security and contribute to sovereignty and global standing. The high levels of defence self-reliance in Sweden, Israel, and South Korea grant them a degree of autonomous movement in times of war. However, Sweden’s decision to join NATO and adopt its military standards might reduce its ability to act alone, as NATO requires interoperability among all member states, placing NATO’s strategic policy above national policy.

Regarding NATO itself, the alliance is organised as a confederation. While guided by American leadership, the U.S. is the largest, wealthiest, and most technologically adept state. NATO has no singular military procurement process. Therefore, member states have a mix of weapons in their arsenals. Some derive from local sources, some from other European manufacturers or the international arms market, but most come from the United States. This makes NATO’s non-U.S. component dependent on the U.S. for weapons and, to a large extent, the American presence in Europe.[12] This dependency revealed a critical strategic vulnerability to European member states during the first Trump administration and Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.

Economic and Technological Benefits

A robust domestic defence industry brings substantial economic and technological benefits. It catalyses job creation across various skill levels, from engineering to manufacturing, boosting local employment and economic stability. Furthermore, developing and producing defence technologies foster innovation, pushing the boundaries in cybersecurity, aerospace, and robotics. These innovations often have dual-use applications, benefiting civilian industries and contributing to national technological progress.

Local manufacturing is pivotal in creating a self-sustaining defence ecosystem. By investing in domestic production capabilities, a nation can reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers, enhancing national security. Local manufacturing supports the development of tailored solutions to meet specific defence needs, ensuring a more responsive and adaptive posture. This ecosystem secures a supply chain and stimulates local economies through a network of suppliers, and service providers interconnected with the defence sector. 

Supply Chain Security

Supply chain security is crucial, mainly as international supply chains often exhibit vulnerabilities that become pronounced during crises. These vulnerabilities can stem from geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, or global pandemics, disrupting the flow of essential goods and services. In defence, such disruption can compromise national security by delaying critical military components and technology.

To mitigate these risks, nations increasingly use strategies to bolster supply chain resilience. One practical approach is promoting local production, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers, and minimising exposure to international disruptions. Local production ensures crucial components are readily available within national borders, enhancing control and response capabilities during emergencies.

Additionally, diversifying supply chains is a strategic imperative. Countries can avoid single points of failure by establishing multiple sources for critical materials and components. This diversification involves multiplying the number of suppliers and ensuring they are spread across different geopolitical areas to prevent collective exposure to the same risks. Local production and diversified supply chains form a robust framework securing a nation’s defence needs against global crises.

Conclusion

Strengthening local weapons manufacturing is a pivotal strategy for enhancing national security in the UAE, alongside its policy of supply diversification. Timely availability of critical defence equipment is not just about military readiness; it is a cornerstone of national sovereignty and resilience. By fostering a robust domestic defence industry, the UAE can ensure its armed forces are well-equipped to address threats without heavy dependence on external suppliers. This strategic autonomy is crucial, especially in a region marked by complex geopolitical dynamics.

Furthermore, continuously maintaining and upgrading local production capabilities cannot be overstated. As defence needs to evolve with advancing technology and shifting tactics, the ability to quickly adapt and innovate is essential. This ensures that defence mechanisms meet current standards and are future-proofed against emerging threats.

From a policy perspective, targeted measures and investments are necessary to nurture indigenous defence industries’ growth. This involves crafting policies encouraging research and development, supporting industry-academia collaborations, and facilitating the commercialisation of new technologies. Moreover, fostering partnerships between government, industry, and academia is crucial for driving innovation and expanding defence capabilities. These collaborative efforts can catalyse advancements in technology and manufacturing processes, ensuring the UAE remains at the cutting edge of defence technology and capability development.

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[1] This phrase is used to describe many Western militaries. But this article from the Daily Mail Australia captures it best when describing Britain’s armed forces: Churchill D., Daily Mail Australia, April 3, 2024, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13265279/Britains-boutique-military-no-depth-former-head-Armed-Forces-claims-amid-calls-increased-defence-spending.html (date accessed: August 21, 2024).

[2] A good and simple example of this is the evolution of fighter planes from the end of World War II onward as found here: SkyCombatAce.com SCA, The Evolution of Fighter Jets, https://www.skycombatace.com/blog/fighter-jet-evolution (date accessed: 21 August, 2024)

[3] Cuoco C.A., The Revolution in Military Affairs: Theoretical Utility and Historical Evidence, Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper, No. 142, April 2010, Athens, Greece, pp.8-9.

[4] Van Bladel J., Mass Matters: Understanding Russia’s Military Conduct and the Threat it Poses, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, March 14, 2024, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/mass-matters-understanding-russias-military-conduct-and-the-threat-it-poses/ (date accessed: August 18, 2024).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Hartley, K. The Arms Industry, Political Influence, and the Transformation of the Defence Market. Defence and Peace Economics, 18(1), 2007, pp. 19-37.

[7] Mabee, B. The Security State and the Globalization of the Arms Industry. In: The Globalization of Security. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234123_5 (date accessed: August 18, 2024).

[8] Miles L., Sweden and European Security: The Derivative Neutrality of a Weak State. Journal of European Integration, 20(1), 1997, pp.61-79.

[9] Norrlof C., The meaning of Sweden’s NATO accession, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), March 25, 2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-meaning-of-swedens-nato-accession/ (date accessed: August 17, 2024).

[10] Ben-Israel Y., (1992). Israel Defence Industry: Defence and Strategic Studies. Tel Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1992.

[11] Bitzinger R. A., South Korea's Defense Industry: An Emerging Global Arms Supplier. Asian Survey, 53(4), 2013, pp.737-762.

[12] Rynning S., NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.