Publication Details

"Quantity has a quality all its own." —

Josef Stalin, USSR, World War II

 8 Sept 2024

Introduction

War is a complex machine with many moving parts. Utilizing organized force to achieve political and strategic objectives is a universal human trait, though it is heavily conditioned by finance, technology, available personnel, and prevailing military doctrine. Throughout history, the concept of mass—defined as the concentration of military forces and firepower at a decisive point and time to overwhelm the enemy—has been a critical component of warfare.

The principle of mass, or in Clausewitzian terms, ‘the Centre of Gravity’ in warfare is rooted in the classic doctrines of military strategy, where achieving numerical superiority at the critical point of engagement was often seen as the key to victory.[1] Historically, mass has been associated with large-scale conventional battles, where armies gathered their forces to deliver a decisive blow. The relevance of mass has evolved with time, adapting to technological advancements and changing military paradigms. However, the recent conflict in Ukraine, starting in February 2022, has starkly reminded the world of the enduring importance of mass in warfare.[2] This conflict has drawn parallels to the trench warfare of World War I and the protracted, high-intensity confrontations of the Iran-Iraq War, underscoring a significant shift back to attritional strategies and large-scale ground operations.

The Lost Lesson – Iran v. Iraq

Before the onset of the 1990s, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) served as a significant state-versus-state conventional conflict that bore many similarities to the large-scale wars of the early 20th century. This eight-year war between two oil-rich Middle Eastern nations—central to the international oil trade—was characterized by tactics and strategies reminiscent of World War I and World War II.[3]

The Iran-Iraq War is famously known for its trench warfare, in which opposing armies dug extensive networks of trenches from which they launched attacks and defended their positions.[4] Like World War I, this war often resulted in long stalemates with high casualties and minimal territorial gains.[5] Iran and Iraq constructed fortified lines, and much of the conflict was defined by attritional strategies, where the objective was to wear down the enemy rather than achieve swift, decisive victories.

Chemical warfare was another grim parallel between the Iran-Iraq War and World War I. Iraq employed chemical weapons extensively against Iranian forces and even against its Kurdish population, most notably in the Halabja chemical attack.[6] Iran was also accused of using chemical weapons, though on a much smaller scale. The use of chemical weapons in both wars was driven by the hope of breaking the stalemate across deep lines of trenches and fortifications, though the human cost was devastating.

Iran, hoping to leverage its numerical superiority over Iraq, frequently used "human wave" assaults, particularly involving the Basij militia and Revolutionary Guards, to overwhelm Iraqi defensive positions. This tactic was reminiscent of the large-scale infantry assaults seen in some of the bloodiest battles of World War I.

Both Iran and Iraq also utilized strategic bombing campaigns, exemplified by the "War of the Cities," in an attempt to break the civilian morale of the opposing side. Iraq further attempted to disrupt Iran's economy by targeting oil installations and tankers in the Persian Gulf, leading to the so-called "Tanker War." These strategies were similar to the blockades and supply line disruptions seen during World Wars I and II, where economic warfare played a crucial role in weakening the enemy's capacity to fight.

The military hardware used in the Iran-Iraq War relied heavily on supplies of American and Soviet-made tanks, fighter aircraft, and other military equipment.[7] The conflict was largely conventional, with battles often decided by the ability to mass and manoeuvre these assets when they could break through the entrenched and fortified positions.

The total human cost of the Iran-Iraq War, with casualties ranging between 600,000 and 1.2 million, is a poignant reminder of the devastating effects of prolonged conventional conflict.[8] It was the world's most destructive traditional war at the time and deeply traumatized Iranian and Iraqi societies. This war also served as a stark reminder of the horrors of conventional mass warfare, something that many believed had been relegated to history.

The New Paradigm of the 1990s

The 1990s ushered in a new era of conflict, defined by the emergence of Asymmetric Warfare.[9] This term came into use to describe conflicts where opposing sides have significantly different military capabilities or strategies, often involving unconventional tactics by the weaker opponent to exploit the vulnerabilities of the more potent force. The weaker side, typically a lightly armed paramilitary or guerrilla force, operated with a highly diffuse command structure and organizational decentralization. This lack of mass made it difficult for conventional military forces to deliver a decisive blow.

In this new paradigm, advanced militaries, especially those of the Western powers, shifted their focus from large-scale, massed formations to more agile, technology-centric forces. By utilizing computational power, satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO),[10] and just-in-time logistics, modern Western fighting forces became smaller and more nimble, capable of rapid deployment to global hotspots.

The concept of mass evolved in this context. While traditional mass—large numbers of troops and equipment—remained significant, technological advances introduced the idea of "mass effects," where precision weapons, information dominance, and networked forces could achieve overwhelming power without the need for extensive physical formations. This approach, characterized by surgical strikes and limited engagements, seemed to signal the end of massed armies as necessary for victory.

However, the Russian "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted the continued relevance of traditional mass in high-intensity, state-on-state warfare.

Hybrid Warfare and the Crimean Precedent

Hybrid warfare represents a strategy that blends conventional military tactics with irregular tactics and cyber operations to achieve strategic goals without engaging in open warfare.[11] This approach leverages the full spectrum of military and non-military tools to destabilize an opponent, including political warfare, economic pressure, proxy forces, and the deployment of misinformation campaigns.

A quintessential example of hybrid warfare was Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. In this operation, Russia employed a combination of unmarked troops, local militias, and extensive information warfare campaigns to create confusion and prevent a coherent response from the international community.[12] These unidentified military personnel —soldiers without insignia—helped facilitate a swift and largely uncontested military takeover, while cyber-attacks and propaganda were used to influence public opinion and disrupt the communication channels of potential Ukrainian and international responses. This operation highlighted the effectiveness of hybrid warfare in achieving strategic objectives while maintaining a veneer of ambiguity and minimizing the risk of direct large-scale conflict.

Putin's successful annexation of Crimea from Ukraine was seen as the future of warfare. However, the decision not to apply this style of warfare to the contested areas of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine remains unclear. This lack of clarity suggests that hybrid warfare might only be effective under specific conditions, particularly under complete strategic surprise. Without surprise, hybrid warfare can be anticipated and countered, reducing its effectiveness.

The Return of the Blunt Hammer of Mass

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces gathered at the border with Ukraine, which led many observers to interpret the situation as a Russian show of force. The prevailing assumption was that Putin intended to pressure Ukrainian President Zelensky into making political and possibly territorial concessions in eastern Ukraine. Few commentators anticipated what would happen next – ‘Operation Z.’

Putin overturned international expectations by launching a military operation aimed at rapidly occupying key Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv. The underlying assumption was that the sheer mass of Russian forces—tanks, artillery, and infantry—would quickly overwhelm Ukrainian defences, leading to a swift collapse of the Ukrainian government.

From 2014 onwards, Western military advisors entered Ukraine and provided training to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in small-scale guerrilla fighting techniques.[13] Armed with Western drones, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, the AFU counterattacked. Russian massed armoured formations and logistics columns were vulnerable to AFU anti-tank fire, while Russian air superiority was largely countered by Western-supplied anti-aircraft missiles. Despite its obvious superiority in mass, the Russian Army was pushed back at the northern approaches to Kyiv. While later, in 2022, the AFU scored significant success in Kharkiv and Kherson, demonstrating that Russian reliance on mass alone was insufficient to secure victory.

Conclusion

The conflict in Ukraine has challenged many prevailing assumptions about modern warfare.

While the 1990s and early 2000s were dominated by the belief that technology and asymmetric tactics had rendered traditional mass obsolete, the events of 2022 have shown that mass remains a critical factor in state-on-state conflict. However, the nature of Ukrainian resistance has also demonstrated that mass, when not adequately supported by strategy, logistics, and morale, can be vulnerable to well-prepared and motivated forces.

As the world observes the ongoing conflict, the lessons from Ukraine will likely reshape military doctrines and force structures globally.

For defence planners and policymakers, the key takeaway is balancing technological advancements with the enduring principles of mass and manoeuvre. This balance will be crucial in preparing for future conflicts, where the old and new paradigms of warfare are likely to coexist and interact in increasingly complex ways.

Defence and security professionals must prepare for contemporary challenges and must integrate these lessons into their curriculum and strategic outlook. Understanding the dynamics of mass warfare in the modern context is essential for building resilient and adaptable forces capable of meeting the multifaceted threats of the 21st century.

***

[1] Col. Fuller J.F.C., The Foundations of the Science of War, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London & Paternoster Row E.C., The Camelot Press Limited, Southampton, Great Britain, 1926, p.14.

[2] Michta A.A., Mass still matters: What the US military should learn from Ukraine, New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, October 3, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mass-still-matters-what-the-us-military-should-learn-from-ukraine/ (date accessed: 12 Aug. 2024).

[3] Overview Iran-Iraq War, Quick Reference 1980-88, Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100010761 (date accessed: 12 Aug., 2024).

[4] The Armchair Historian, Modern Trench Warfare: Iran-Iraq, The Armchair Historian YouTube Channel, March 2024, https://youtu.be/7quabnJ-4z8?si=ApCgP101Rp_zDBWO (date accessed: 11 Aug., 2024).

[5] Mainprize R.P., The Iran-Iraq War and the Lessons for Ukraine, War on the Rocks, Feb. 9, 2023 https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-iran-iraq-war-and-the-lessons-for-ukraine/ (date accessed: 12 Aug., 2024).

[6] Brill M., Iraqi Records and the History of Iran’s Chemical Weapons Program, Wilson Center, Washington DC, March 29, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/part-i-we-attacked-them-chemical-weapons-and-they-attacked-us-chemical-weapons-iraqi  (date accessed: 10 Aug., 2024).

[7] U.S. Directorate of Intelligence, Iran-Iraq: Buying Weapons for War an Intelligence Assessment, Sanitised Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/23, pp.1-22. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000500120005-5.pdf (date accessed 09 Aug., 2024).

[8] Black I., Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives, The Guardian, 23 Sept., 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary (date accessed 09 Aug., 2024).

[9] Milevski L., Asymmetry is Strategy, Strategy is Asymmetry, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) 75, National Defence University (NDU) Press, Sept., 30, 2014, pp.77-83.

[10] Machi V., US Places a Bet on LEO for Space Security, Space Development Agency (SDA), June 2021, https://www.sda.mil/us-military-places-a-bet-on-leo-for-space-security/ (date accessed: 12 Aug., 2024).

[11] Bilal A., Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity and ‘Trust’ as the Antidote, NATO Review, 30 Nov., 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html (date accessed: 09 Aug., 2024).

[12] Bargués P. & Bourekba M., War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Sept. 2022, https://www.cidob.org/en/publication/war-all-means-rise-hybrid-warfare (date accessed: 12 Aug., 2024).

[13] Teuscher C., Ukraine’s Western Military Brains Trust, Medium, Dec., 16 2022, https://medium.com/@carson.teuscher/ukraines-western-military-brain-trust-a521c936d9ab (date accessed: 11 Aug., 2024).

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.