is an Interim Manager and Senior Fellow Researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute (RSDI)
1 October 2024
Background
Indonesia’s Presidential Election which was held on 14th February 2024 is a testament of whether Indonesia’s 10 year ‘free and active’ foreign policy remains or taking on a new course. Up to date, the Jokowi (Joko Widodo) Administration has pursued Indonesia’s national interest based on objectivism and merit which are aligned to the nation’s sustainability in the long run. The election in Indonesia holds significant importance in shaping Indonesia’s approach to security issues in the South China Sea, amidst China’s activities in Indonesian waters. Under the current Jokowi administration, Indonesia has consistently responded firmly to China’s actions concerning the Natuna Islands and its territorial waters. Over the years, securitisation in Southeast Asia is manageable even though the region faces an uphill journey due to escalation in the South China Sea (SCS). Indonesia is not a claimant to the SCS however, it connotes with other claimants’ calls (Brunei, The Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam) in enticing China to return to multilateralism settings via the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) negotiation, which was left abandoned since 2012. However, with Beijing’s active presence especially in the Natuna Islands (a group of islands with abundance of natural resources situated in Indonesian waters), Jakarta’s response has led to the increase in securitisation from 2013 to 2023. This short article analyses three scenarios, resulting from Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election based on candidates’ aspirations, implementation capacity and feasibility in the regional context. Although the election outcome is known, the article firstly aims to highlight how SCS securitisation is measured by the candidates throughout the election campaigns. Second, following Prabowo Subianto’s accession to the presidency, what scenarios we could generate in forecasting Indonesia’s behaviour in the SCS. Three scenarios are predicted which a premised upon the fact that:
a) Securitisation in the Southeast Asia remains as a status quo.
b) Change in Continuity (some mechanics will be improvised and added-on to the existing securitisation framework).
c) Major Shift (complete turn-over from existing framework)
A map shows Indonesia’s archipelagic islands contain 272 Natuna Islands.
Narratives and Approaches
Prior to scenario building based on the election outcome, it is best to revisit candidates’ approaches toward defence and security, and also on China and the South China Sea[ii]. There were three candidates running for the post namely Anies Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto and Ganjar Pranowo.
Anies Baswedan is an academician who turned to be the Governor of Jakarta from 2017 to 2022. As a scholar in public policy, he tried not to deviate much from the regional policy setting. He relies on multilateral setups such as ASEAN as a focal point to the security complex in Southeast Asia. Although Anies is fully aware that Laos and Myanmar are strong allies to China, he acknowledges ASEAN as a regional entity and important mechanism to face external powers within and beyond the region. In addition, Anies highlights the importance of non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity, human and drug trafficking and mineral scarcity.
Under Anies Administration (hypothetically), Indonesia’s behaviour remains as status quo, by relying on the existing framework, especially ASEAN. His administration is likely to adopt an innovative approach towards securitisation. Indonesia will retain its normalcy in regional securitisation and regional security will not undergo a substantive shift. The positive side of this strategy connotes the strong points for multilateralism in solving securitisation issues in Southeast Asia. No country can solve all security problems on its own. Rather, Anies still believe that cooperation and collaboration will be the mechanics, although things will move slow (if not nothing at all) in ASEAN context.
Prabowo Subianto hails from Gerakan Indonesia Raya (GERINDRA Party), which has average stronghold (78 out of 575 House of Representative seats). As Indonesia’s current Defence Minister, he gravitates towards defence and defence modernisation for Indonesia. This includes alleviating the usage of sea patrols and satellites to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty. He argues that Indonesia’s defence capacity needs to be developed and be at par with other developing countries around the region, to sustain Indonesia’s interest. This includes building up naval forces around the Natuna Islands as a deterrent when facing Chinese fishing vessels and patrols. Prabowo is fully aware of the securitisation in South China Sea and SEA, believing Indonesia will only be able to strive and to protect itself, if the defence capabilities are up to date.
It is nothing new to note that Prabowo has a great appetite towards defence and military modernisation. The former army lieutenant general had witnessed the longevity of Soeharto’s reign throughout the Cold War and how Indonesia has always been the target for terrorism even after Soeharto’s era. Incoming Prabowo Administration will focus on military expansionism for Indonesia although this will not shift Indonesia into a full-fledged autocratic rule. This will come at a cost as many Human Rights advocates warn for a further erosion to Indonesian democracy.
What is interesting to be seen, is how the Indonesian defence budget will expand over the next few years and that will be resonated by neighbouring countries. Areas surrounding the Natuna Islands will be heavily securitised (more so than before) with some military complexes to be built following his pledge during the election.
Continuity (in foreign and defence major policies) will be the government’s immediate approach for Prabowo’s presidency, at least in the first 12 months heralding the office. Bulked with domestic concerns over economic growth, underemployment and wealth distribution, his administration will strive to gain public’s confidence and would only return to regional security concerns when needs arise. However, a major directional shift in defence and security will be unlikely for the first 12 months, as his administration is still acclimatising to governing the country at the same time, addressing domestic issues.
Ganjar Pranowo is an Indonesian politician, having served as the Governor of Java from 2013 to 2023. As a realist politician, his views depart from multilateralism and centralise inward aspiration and capacity of Indonesia to meddle SEA securitisation. Centring on the One China Policy, in his opinion, Indonesia should go hand in hand with China. This also comes with the need to revitalise ASEAN towards better decision making for the region. In Ganjar’s opinion, ASEAN should have been bolder in approaching regional and global issues (which include securitisation of the SCS).
Ganjar proposes for stronger state-centric measures for Indonesia in navigating regional securitisation in SEA. His argument derives from the slow reactions of multilateral institutions like ASEAN in solving the SCS issues. This reflects ‘a foreign policy begins at home’ approach as Ganjar pays more attention to Indonesia’s domestic interest. He believes that, in navigating the SCS, while Indonesia is not a claimant, a strong Indonesia-China economic relations will enable Indonesia to protect its interest in the SCS. All Ganjar’s opinions do not suggest that he rejects multilateralism in its totality. His vision comes as a two-pronged strategy – first, Indonesia cannot wait for multilateral setting to carry Jakarta’s interest in times of uncertainty and second, multilateral institutions like ASEAN should review, revamp and revitalise so it can be an effective decision maker. The consensus decision policy, while it maintains the harmony within its member countries, does not move the needle much in solving security challenges in the region.
Election Results
Prabowo Subianto (current Minister of Defence) claimed victory in the Indonesian general election of 2024. All major pollsters report Prabowo’s success in claiming 57%-59% votes, based on the samples collected from 2,000 polling stations[iii]. The other two candidates, former Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan settled with 24%-26%[iv], and former Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo received 15%-17%[v] of the entire votes. Prabowo is scheduled to be sworn as the President in October 2024, when President Jokowi ends his term. There are many reasons that contributed to Prabowo’s victory. SCS securitisation is not the only one. Moving forward, it is important to weigh some prospective scenarios as to how the Prabowo’s administration will shape Indonesia’s securitisation into the SCS.
Scenario Plotting
There are three possible scenarios in describing Indonesia’s securitisation approach for the Prabowo Administration.
Scenario 1: Securitisation in Southeast Asia remains status-quo
Securitisation in Southeast Asia will mirror Jokowi’s second presidential term. Indonesia has been projecting a progressive securitisation, from narrative building and to positioning its naval capabilities. This also takes into consideration that Prabowo is leading the defence ministry from 2019 until present, which gives him a clear picture of the situation. The likelihood of this scenario should be guaranteed in the first 12 months of his presidency due to adjustment and acclimatisation of his team to the new role. Indonesia has also been bulked into domestic issues when 9.4% of its population lived below the national poverty line[vi], which needs to be tackled, in projecting his potential as the new president.
With a landslide win, Prabowo still has to work hard in securing Indonesians’ acceptance to his Presidency. Image rebranding as his soft power will likely continue as this will aide Prabowo in convincing the Indonesians of his new role. Prabowo will deviate from his past baggage as someone who was involved in mistreating democracy activists in the late 90s, and move to a 360-degree leader that all Indonesians need. This will sideline hardcore security matters on his plate until he has found his grip in his new role.
However, the scenario would not stand consistently for the next five years as Chinese military expansionism is not taken into consideration into this scenario.
Scenario 2: Change in Continuity (some mechanics will be improvised and added-on to the existing securitisation framework).
Prabowo pledged Change in Continuity during the campaign to assure Indonesia maintains its decorum and reputation. This means, while principles and national aspiration remain the same, some mechanics will be improvised and added on to the existing frameworks. A more securitised SCS is certainly a picture in 2025 and onwards. However, the securitisation growth will depend on two factors. First, China’s military modernisation will be completed in 2027. Indonesia will need to adjust to new developments, depending on China’s reaction in the SCS and surrounding the Natuna Islands. Second, behaviours of SCS claimant countries’ relations with China will also shape the dynamics on Indonesian securitisation. If SCS claims tend to be stagnant, while Chinese military presence is increasing, Indonesia will counter react by increasing more economic and military activities.
The Indonesian defence industry will be crafted to address the security threats surrounding the Natuna Islands. Increase of military spending was what Prabowo aimed at during his campaign. There is a tendency that his administration will allow unprecedented military spending, using the Natuna Islands as its justification for the financial approval. It ticks all the boxes, especially those who have been profiling Prabowo in his early days in the military as well as in politics.
Scenario 3: Major Shift (complete turn-over from existing framework)
Scenario 3 will result in an unprecedented speed of Indonesian securitisation into the region. Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) presence will be twice as active from its normalcy and will send an unambiguous antagonistic response to China’s patrols. Small scale confrontations could occur involving patrolling vessels between 2 countries and will instigate other claimant countries to bandwagon with Indonesia. The likelihood of Scenario 3 occurring, depends on Indonesia’s economic resilience vis-à-vis trade relations with China. At the moment, economic resilience will not be able to accommodate any trade sanctions from China.
From the military security point of view, an arms race will be on the rise and judging from Indonesia’s strong relations with other countries, the antagonistic response will invite the presence of others into the region, adding complexities to the region.
As someone who gained experience both in military and politics, Prabowo understands the need to be moderate and accommodative leader. Introducing radical reforms (deviating from the practice of Jokowi administration) will be risky as Indonesia is still benefitting from the legacy of Jokowi administration.
Analysing all, Scenario 2 is most likely to take place in the Prabowo administration. The finding is supported when comparing closely between Prabowo’s political career spanning over 20 years and his recent narratives projection during presidential campaign. Considering Indonesia’s close economic relations with China, there is a low likelihood for the administration to introduce hard measures that will upset the administration. Indonesia’s capability in navigating major power relations manifests pragmatism and being objective when approaching foreign countries. The only potential risk would be its own economic growth reversal that would create a public trust deficit to his administration. Hence, balancing external threat with economic risks is something Prabowo would consider if he wants to conclude his first term successfully.
[i] The author would like to thank Virdika Rizky Utama, Indonesia’s rising political analyst who provided feedback and comments.
[ii] The narratives are announced during the Presidential Debate – Part 3 on Defence, Geopolitics and International Relations. In minute 1:01:00 there was a question on China and SCS. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sumPwQpw4JM3
[iii] https://jakartaglobe.id/news/prabowo-vows-to-be-president-for-all-citizens-in-victory-speech
[iv] http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=1&pn=1&st=Philippines&code=&at=view&idx=351&ckattempt=1
[v] Ibid.
[vi] https://www.adb.org/where-we-work/indonesia/poverty#:~:text=In%20Indonesia%2C%209.4%25%20of%20the,die%20before%20their%205th%20birthday
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.