Publication Details

28 October 2024

In late July 2024, Russian contractors and the Malian military lost dozens of personnel in an ambush in the country’s north.[1] Though the loss was modest in relation to the number of mercenaries in country, the ambush, and particularly the accusations of Ukrainian involvement, quickly reached international headlines. The event shows just how ingrained Russian activity has become in the public’s perception of African security issues.

To be sure, Russia is involved in a variety of activities in Africa. Moscow was and is a major arms supplier to the continent, but their assertive security assistance to several countries in Central Africa and the Sahel is what grabs headlines. In 2018 the Wagner Group, under a different name, entered the Central African Republic (CAR) under the pretext of teaching the country’s shattered military how to use new Russian supplied arms.[2] Wagner also found itself involved in Mozambique, Madagascar, Libya, and Sudan.

Where Wagner in Africa went from a gonzo sideshow to mainstream press was their deployment to Mali after a military coup overthrew the democratic government.[3] Allegations that Russia and Wagner were in contact with several coup leaders led to an association between subsequent coups in the region, such as Guinea, Burkina Faso (twice), and Niger, and malign Russian influence.[4] Wagner and other Russian deployments to Mali and Burkina Faso seemingly confirmed the idea that this was a grand design to unseat traditional security partners like France, the United States, and the United Nations. Reality is significantly more complicated: coups reflect the preferences and incentives of the officers that took control of the government, rather than the population at large. Burkina Faso, for instance, had no confirmed Wagner presence under the first coup’s leader and is significantly more modest under the second coup leader, Traore, than it is in Mali.[5]

Of course, the progression of Russian influence in Africa is influenced by two major events: the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the deaths of Wagner’s core leaders: Yevgeny Prigozhin and operational leader Dmitri Utkin in 2023.[6] The invasion of Ukraine meant that Wagner was drawn away from its deployments in Africa and the Middle East. While most contractors in Africa stayed or were replaced, Wagner did not expand quickly into places like Burkina Faso. Prigozhin and Utkin’s deaths brought about major changes on the surface, but surprisingly little under it. Wagner in Africa was rolled into the government controlled project “Africa Corps” and given significantly more oversight from the intelligence services, but not that much changed on the ground.[7] Even the Wagner name and logo remains in places like CAR.

Of course, Russian ambitions extend beyond Wagner. Russia’s presence also includes other paramilitary and government forces, such as the “Bear Brigade.”[8] Russia has also provided weapons to friendly regimes, notably helicopters and L39 Albatross aircraft that would be of limited utility in the war in Ukraine but are significant force multipliers in the Sahel’s civil wars and counterinsurgencies.[9]

Moscow wants returns on its investments. For instance, Russia has consistently sought a naval base on the Red Sea. Most foreign bases are located in Djibouti, but Russia has wanted a naval facility in Sudan for years, judging that a mostly friendly regime and lack of competing bases would let the navy establish a lasting presence. After years of negotiations with the Sudanese government complicated by an ongoing civil war, Sudanese officials have indicated that the base would be going ahead, although no ground has yet been broken.[10]

No Way Forward

One could easily claim that Russia’s plan for Africa “worked.” They successfully used government backed contractors to establish a presence in several countries and contributed to multiple withdrawals of French, American, and EU troops from west and central Africa. They can also point to some military successes on behalf of their host states. Notably, they defeated CAR rebels at the gates of capital city Bangui and rolled them back to the country’s periphery in 2021 and 2022.[11] To date, none of the regimes protected by Wagner have fallen victim to a coup or mutiny.

At the same time, it remains to be seen how well Russia can maintain and expand on what it has built. The conflicts in which they are now embroiled are not easy to solve. The Sahelian nations have failed to defeat competent terrorist and separatist groups for over a decade and CAR’s rebels are rooted in areas that have longstanding grievances with the central government. Russian contractors might be able to protect leaders and contain armed groups, but their ability to “win” remains to be seen, particularly after the international community’s better funded and larger missions to these countries couldn’t bring peace.

Wagner also some reversals on its record. It’s mission to Mozambique in 2019, a purely mercenary affair in which they underbid other contractors, failed to defeat the region’s extremist group and led to a public spat with the Mozambican military.[12] Wagner’s purely political/economic ventures in Madagascar also stumbled out of the gate, with Prigozhin linked enterprises shutting down.[13] Then of course, there was the recent ambush in Mali, in which led to dozens of casualties.

How many more missions Russia can reasonably launch? In a sense it depends on how many African countries are interested. Russia might be able to produce more contractors after the war in Ukraine ends, but with no end in sight Moscow’s priority remains the more proximate conflict. For African leaders, even ones who came to power through a coup, engagement with Russia carries risks. Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali’s break with the international community in favor of Russia led to the dissolution of a UN peacekeeping mission, their exit from regional economic bloc ECOWAS, and cuts to international aid at a time when extremists groups are growing in power and influence. Future West African militaries might not be thrilled with how their civilian leadership handles the threat of terrorism, but they might not be eager to throw out their existing relationships if Russia can’t deliver a workable alternative.

How Does Russia Stack Up to Other Powers?

For all the attention Russia’s activities in Africa gets, its worth interrogating whether they’re a major presence on the continent. For instance, before the Civil War broke out in Sudan, Russia’s bilateral trade with the country was dwarfed by China, who sought to import Sudanese oil and export manufactured goods. Chinese economic cooperation with African countries is titanic by comparison and while some commentaries lump their efforts together, Moscow’s willingness to profit from insecurity is at odd’s with Beijing’s preference for stable (if illiberal) economic partners.[14] Even Russia’s arms trade, which found willing buyers in African countries like Egypt and Algeria for decades, is declining as China and other nations develop competitive alternatives.[15]

Middle Eastern countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which all have smaller economies and populations than Russia, routinely play a larger role on the continent. As they are more proximate to the continent, all three nations seek investment opportunities and are wary of security challenges, particularly in North Africa and the Horn. For instance, Turkey’s trade with African countries is now in the tens of billions of dollars per year as Ankara boosts its diplomatic and economic relationships. On the military side, Turkey has been exporting military equipment like TB2 Bayraktar drones, and their own Private Military Company, SADAT, has been active in several African countries.[16][17]

The UAE meanwhile has sought to expand their engagement in Africa through commercial deals as well as security cooperation.[18] The Emirates is now the fourth largest foreign investor on the continent alongside the US, China, and European Union.[19] Emirati logistics company DP World has a growing number of hubs across the continent and plans to invest billions of dollars more in the coming years.[20] However, DP World’s planned expansion in Berbera has embroiled the company in the broader rivalries between Somalia and Ethiopia, which highlights the risk of economic engagement with nations at loggerheads.[21]  

Saudi Arabia has also sought a larger role in Africa. In late 2023 the Kingdom hosted a well-attended summit with African leaders promising assistance with debt and conflict mediation.[22] Large investments in African development has earned Riyadh praise from African institutions.[23]

Lastly, the United States and European Union are also significantly larger players in Africa than Russia.  Russia may have complicated the relationship between several African countries and “the west,” but Mali, CAR, Niger, and Burkina Faso account for a miniscule part of Africa’s economy compared to countries like Egypt, South Africa, and Angola, which have substantial relationships with Europe and the US. Even Europe’s smaller nations countries conduct training exercises, sell arms, and cooperate on security matters. Just recently, Hungary sent forces to Chad to conduct training and security cooperation.[24] The tendency for African nations that embrace Russia to break with African institutions does little to convince countries like Ghana and Senegal that they should also dump their existing partnerships.

None of these partners are perfect. The US and many European nations have a troubling history in Africa, Chinese engagement produces mixed results, and the UAE and Turkey’s engagement in places like Somalia put them in the middle of regional disputes between Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Djibouti. Saudi Arabia’s growing engagement with African countries may also be tinged by geopolitics, as some analysis claim African engagement is a way for the Kingdom to counter Iranian influence abroad.[25]

Conclusion

Russia is engaging in destructive activities in Africa, but it is important not to overstate their influence. Russia can take limited advantage of chaotic situations but finds it much more difficult to build lasting economic relationships on the scale of other countries like China, the US, or regional powers. This limits their influence. Instead of focusing on their relationship with African countries directly, Russia’s strategy for Africa now aims disrupt the roles of other foreign powers, which only works in African countries that are already tired of their existing partnerships. As Russia continues to spend blood and treasure on its invasion of Ukraine, most African countries will seek to work with established and trustworthy partners.

[1] Christopher Michael Faulkner, “Wagner Group Setback in Mali Challenges Moscow’s Strategy in Africa and the Region’s Faith in Russian Mercenaries,” The Conversation, August 9, 2024, http://theconversation.com/wagner-group-setback-in-mali-challenges-moscows-strategy-in-africa-and-the-regions-faith-in-russian-mercenaries-236285.

[2] “Russia Is Back In Africa — and Making Some Very Odd Deals,” Defense One, May 22, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/05/russia-back-africa-and-making-some-very-odd-deals/148371/.

[3] “Mali’s Plan for Russia Mercenaries to Replace French Troops Unsettles Sahel,” BBC News, October 1, 2021, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58751423.

[4] Theodore Murphy, “Middle Powers, Big Impact: Africa’s ‘Coup Belt,’ Russia, and the Waning Global Order,” ECFR, September 6, 2023, https://ecfr.eu/article/middle-powers-big-impact-africas-coup-belt-russia-and-the-waning-global-order/.

[5] Marcel Plichta, “Burkina Faso Won’t Be the Wagner Group’s Next ‘Domino’ in Africa,” World Politics Review , August 15, 2022, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/wagner-group-africa-russia/.

[6] “Wagner in Africa: Precarious Future after Prigozhin’s Reported Death,” BBC News, August 26, 2023, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66614766.

[7] “‘Africa Corps’: Russia’s West African Presence Rebranded,” December 17, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html.

[8] “The Bear Brigade, the Kremlin’s New Paramilitary Outfit in Africa,” July 14, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/07/14/the-bear-brigade-the-kremlin-s-new-paramilitary-outfit-in-africa_6684180_124.html.

[9] “Mali Gets More Warplanes, Helicopters from Russia | Africanews,” accessed September 11, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2023/01/20/mali-gets-more-warplanes-helicopters-from-russia/.

[10] “Sudan Military Finishes Review of Russian Red Sea Base Deal,” AP News, February 11, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-sudan-government-moscow-803738fba4d8f91455f0121067c118dd.

[11] “Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic | Crisis Group,” December 3, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic.

[12] “When Private Military Operations Fail: The Case of Mozambique | Oxford Political Review | Oxford Political Review,” March 6, 2023, https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique/.

[13] “MADAGASCAR : Kraoma’s Chrome Plans Stymied by Politics - 08/12/2022,” Africa Intelligence, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2022/12/08/kraoma-s-chrome-plans-stymied-by-politics,109872167-art.

[14] Cobus van Staden, “Nigeria and China Announce New Cooperation Agreements,” The China-Global South Project, September 4, 2024, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2024/09/04/nigeria-and-china-announce-new-cooperation-agreements/.

[15] P D Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023,” SIPRI.

[16] “Turkey’s Arms Industry Takes off in Africa,” The Africa Report.com, 4, https://www.theafricareport.com/325048/turkeys-arms-industry-takes-off-in-africa/.

[17] “Sadat, the ‘Turkish Wagner’ Whose Shadow Hangs over West Africa,” June 7, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/06/07/sadat-the-turkish-wagner-whose-shadow-hangs-over-west-africa_6674134_124.html.

[18] “The UAE’s Rising Military Role in Africa: Defending Interests, Advancing Influence,” ISPI, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-uaes-rising-military-role-in-africa-defending-interests-advancing-influence-172825.

[19] “Is the UAE the New Superpower in Africa?,” The Africa Report.com, https://www.theafricareport.com/in-depth/is-the-uae-the-new-superpower-in-africa/.

[20] “DP World Plans $3 Billion Investment in African Ports by 2029 - Bloomberg,” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-13/dp-world-plans-3-billion-investment-in-african-ports-by-2029?embedded-checkout=true.

[21] “Ethiopia’s Port Deal With Somaliland Could Endanger Regional Stability,” The Maritime Executive, https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/ethiopia-s-port-deal-with-somaliland-could-endanger-regional-stability.

[22] “First Saudi-Africa Summit: Off to a Rocky Start?,” ISS Africa, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/first-saudi-africa-summit-off-to-a-rocky-start.

[23] African Development Bank, “African Development Bank President Praises Saudi Arabia for Billions of Dollars of Investment in Africa,” Text, African Development Bank Group (African Development Bank Group, September 2, 2024), https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-president-praises-saudi-arabia-billions-dollars-investment-africa-73856.

[24] “Government to Launch Military Mission to Chad,” Hungary Today, October 16, 2023, https://hungarytoday.hu/government-to-launch-military-mission-to-chad/.

[25] “Saudi Arabia’s Investment: The Price of Africa,” Grey Dynamics, https://greydynamics.com/saudi-arabias-investment-the-price-of-africa/.