Publication Details

10 December 2024

Malaysia has a bold vision for its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), which it begins in January when it succeeds Laos. Along with fostering inclusivity and sustainability within the region, the Southeast Asian country will promote the doctrine of ASEAN Centrality, which aims to ensure that the region’s future is determined by its members, not by foreign powers.

The dynamics of the region, especially in Myanmar and the South China Sea, will be a challenge for Malaysia. Previous chairs Cambodia (2022), Indonesia (2023) and Laos (2024) made little progress on these two issues, leading to criticism that ASEAN is an ineffective union. Malaysia’s pragmatic approach might be the solution to these problems.

Cracks in the wall: Situations in China and Myanmar Threaten Bloc’s Unity

On most issues, ASEAN countries realise the importance of being regionally unified in approaching security, political, and economic matters. The South China Sea, however, has been a source of polarisation and disunity amongst ASEAN countries. When Cambodia was chair in 2012, for example, it refused to insert a territorial dispute between China and Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, who jointly contested the expansion of nine-dash line by China in the South China Sea. Cambodia’s refusal, despite being pressured by contesting parties to include the dispute, was a missed chance by ASEAN to send a message to China.

ASEAN unity is also challenged by the situation in Myanmar. The bloc arrived at a five-point consensus, but its response has been criticised as slow and ineffective at solving the Rohingya refugee crisis. This has become a point of contention when dealing with Western countries, and there has been talk of isolating or even excluding Myanmar from important dialogues, as at a 2023 summit between ASEAN and the United States.

A Way Forward: Three ways Malaysia Can Steer ASEAN to Success

Despite these setbacks, ASEAN has had successes such as the free-trade agreements ASEAN+1, and ASEAN+3, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in 2006, the East Asia Summit in 2005, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference in 1989.

In order to move forward, ASEAN needs to ensure that members are fully committed to centrality, and don’t disregard it when it is convenient. The bloc should also look beyond political-security concerns and investigate whether firms and human resources could be deployed to centralise economic activities within the region. Malaysia could make progress in this regard by adopting the three-pronged “2Intra-1Inter Approach.”

1)      Facilitation to enhance communications towards an effective dispute-settlement mechanism.

Article 22 of the General Principles in the ASEAN Charter states: ‘member states shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation, and negotiation.’[i] Conventionally, ASEAN member countries are bound by the principle of non-interference, hence, communications are limited to issues on development and cooperation. In the case of Myanmar, however, ASEAN has unresolved issues that cause security concerns to neighbouring states, especially when refugees who fled the country land on the stones of neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. At the moment, communication is stalled on the basis of respecting the principle of non-interference.

ASEAN is prone to regional disputes ranging from transboundary haze, illegal migrants, exclusive economic zones, and maritime issues and cannot afford the passive management of disputes under the notion of non-interference. Malaysia should facilitate more robust communications and build a regional dispute-settlement mechanism to strengthen ASEAN Centrality. This can be done by integrating more dialogue between government representatives and non-governmental experts (known as track 1.5 diplomacy), and unofficial, informal interactions between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies (track 2 diplomacy), to influence public opinion and organise human and material resources in ways that might help resolve conflicts.[ii]

2)      Facilitation to enhance mobility of wealth and human resources across the region.

At the end of its tenure as the chair of ASEAN in 2015, Malaysia introduced the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), a vision of the region as a single market with a production base to be built by 2025. The AEC was seen as ambitious a decade ago, as the region still faced economic disparities between its members, and progress towards the common market was hampered, especially with the reaction to the COVID pandemic causing more countries to focus on their domestic economies.

When Laos took over as chair in 2016, progress on the AEC stalled, but Malaysia could revitalise the project now that it has the reins again. To do this, they should set up centres within the region to expedite market integration and ensure that human resources and wealth can be mobilised thoroughly. Specifically, they should empower 100 private firms (30 large corporations, 40 medium SMEs, and 30 SMEs) to break through all economic barriers in the region. Local communities can enjoy the economic spillover by integrating regional players into their domestic markets. ASEAN domestic companies would also have the opportunity to penetrate foreign markets in member countries, creating a circulation of human resources and wealth in the region.

3)      Facilitation of an integrative approach with partners to project ASEAN interests as its core.

In Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter, which has been enforced since 2008, the purpose of the bloc is ‘to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.”[iii] This has enabled the development of ASEAN+1, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), East Asia Summit (EAS) and Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC).

Maintaining central control, however, has not been easy, given recent geopolitical developments. The competition between China and the U.S. has challenged the internal cohesion of ASEAN countries, who have been forced to focus on managing their relations with the great powers. The rise of the BRICS and other multilateral organisations has also created problems for ASEAN[iv].

Navigating the complexities will not be easy for a country like Malaysia, however, the country has experienced diplomats, who have been tested in tough situations such as the Malaysia Airlines crashes in 2014 (MH370 and MH17). Though ASEAN negotiations are complex, Kuala Lumpur has shown it has the bargaining power to bring major and middle powers into negotiation tables, thanks to its hedging diplomacy.

As Rizal Sukma, the Director of Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, notes: “ASEAN has the strategic position to drive this change, but it will take new levels of political courage and coordination, institutionalised regional structures, and unprecedented levels of proactive diplomacy. ASEAN’s responsibility is clear.”[v]

[i] The ASEAN Charter (2007), accessible via https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf

[ii] Montville, J. (1991). Unofficial Diplomacy at Work (pp 161-175). Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

[iii] The ASEAN Charter (2007), accessible via https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf

[iv] Wicaksana, G.W. & Karim M.F. (2023) “How Regional Organisation Survives: ASEAN, Hedging and International Society,” Contemporary Politics, 29:5, 659-679.

DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2023.2216031

[v] Rizal Sukma, “Insight: Without Unity, No Centrality,” The Jakarta Post (17 July 2012).