Publication Details

16 Dec 2024

Introduction

Repurposed civilian technologies and devices have been used as instruments of conflict since ancient times. The objective was to obtain a strategic advantage against the adversaries, usually achieved through a strategic surprise or a combination of technological and strategic surprise. This involves seizing an opportunity while employing innovative techniques, tactics, processes, or groundbreaking technologies to alter the strategic environment and thereby shift warfare dynamics towards a favourable outcome. Throughout history, the implementation of various innovative strategies and technologies has played significant roles in military dynamics. For example, the Trojan Horse was a clever tool of deception in ancient times that created a significant vulnerability for the Trojans. Centuries later, the Roman roads supported the expansion of trade, but they also allowed for the swift movement of military forces to maintain order across the empire.

The previous century was marked by an arms race among superpowers, great powers, and middle powers. This era saw significant advancements, including the development of satellites, nuclear technology, the internet, and hypersonic weapons. It also witnessed the reintroduction of modern drones equipped with intelligence and offensive capabilities, along with the growing widespread use of artificial intelligence.

In their quest for power and to maintain a strategic military advantage, countries have invested and continue to invest significantly in the research and development (R&D) of new technologies. However, this investment carries a substantial economic burden.          

Especially during the Cold War, this intense arms competition and seeking advanced technology and high-impact weapons imposed a significant economic burden, stagnating the states' economies and compelled them to seek alternative funding sources. The dual use of technology for both military and civilian applications approach in the 1960s-70s provided a significant gateway for this huge economic burden, introducing the civilian usage of these technologies. One clear example is the introduction of the internet in the 1960s as an academic project called the “Advanced Research Projects Agency Network” (ARPANET), initiated by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), which during the 1980s started to evolve into the internet we know today. In the 1980s, the world experienced a military revolution driven by advancements in military research. This shift was rooted in the development of weapon technology during World War II and was further accelerated by the information dominance doctrine (Libicki, 1997).

Today, a new phase of opening up seems to be emerging in the 21st century because, increasingly, technological innovation is facilitating the 'weaponisation of the civilians significantly,' obstructing military operations (Dobias, 2024). Hence, we are witnessing an era where off-the-shelf products are becoming tools of violence for governments or non-government actors. Terrorist groups exploit supermarket items and electronics to create and deliver explosive devices to satisfy their objectives (Lemieux et al., 2014).

This paper aims to present and evaluate briefly several cases concerning the weaponisation of civilian innovations and technologies. It will reflect on earlier periods to identify patterns of technological adaptation and the use of these technologies for military and combative purposes across different eras.

The history of how civil technologies and innovations of peaceful times repeatedly became means of warfare is described. Like the social, political and economic channels, they respond to the demands and transformations of society. This historical perspective does not allow for predictions but reveals cycles and patterns similar to those occurring now. Early human societies confronted these processes when some peaceful inventions were used to justify the need for change in society politics, international protection, and domestic laws and policies on civil technologies and civilian life. Past scenarios influence future thinking. Once an idea for innovative (re)use is proposed, various players, whether state or non-state, could benefit. As Napoleon argued, “You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.” (Moore, 2017) This means that once an innovative approach or technology is used it is a matter of time until the adversaries will learn and adapt.

Case Studies of Modern Conflict and Civil Technologies

This can be better understood by examining case studies illustrating how these civilian technologies influence warfighting and their effects.

Three points are indicated by the case studies. The first has to do with the very large set of technologies, innovations and approaches to which this process can be applied. The other speaks to the challenged value of this weaponisation to actors embroiled in warfare. I argue that, unlike technological determinists who claim that emerging technologies will strategically benefit their users, the potential of disruptive technologies can impact both users and their adversaries.

The third conclusion regarding the threat, emphasises its emerging and open nature. Local fighters (non-state actors), typically do not have superior firepower compared to the military. However, they are increasingly enhancing their operational effectiveness and situational awareness by using and modifying civilian technologies, such as basic air or surface drones and social media. This asymmetrical advantage results in significant altering in the dynamics of warfare, allowing them to challenge conventional military forces (internet, drones, etc.).

 These arguments can be better understood through the comparative analysis of significant historical and modern cases such as:

Trojan horse. Weaponising civilian-like objects for military purposes has been done since the days of the Trojan War as mentioned in Aeneid by Virgil (Gaskell, 1999); one of the most famous examples is the Trojan horse, believed to have occurred in the 12th or 13th century BCE. It was a deceptive tool. The idea was to hide the best Greek warriors in a huge, hollow wooden horse, presented to the Trojans as a gift symbolising the end of Greece’s siege. The Greeks seemed to had “left the war”, and then the Trojans brought the horse into their city to symbolise their victory, believing it was abandoned. The hidden Greek soldiers emerged from the horse at night, opened the gates, and allowed the Greek army to enter Troy, and Troy fell (Luce, 1998; Powell, 2020).

The Trojan horse was a cunning use of psychological warfare, using the Trojans' belief in divine omens and their desire for it to finish for a great effect finally. Thus, the Trojan Horse was a stroke of intelligence, deception, and misdirection as it hoodwinked the Trojans into inviting upon themselves their destruction (Korfmann, 2004; Wood, 1996) . This tactic is still used today, especially in the cyber domain, where malware imitates legitimate software to deceive antivirus programs and operating systems, often classified as a trojan horse (Powell, 2020).

The creation of the Internet. What was initially created as ARPANET in the 1960s by the U.S. Department of Defence, for facilitating academic research, it grew to civilian and public use in the early 1980s, while remaining as a tool for military usage. The development of ARPANET aimed to allow the US government to enable communications in the potential event of nuclear disruptions to wireless communications and to facilitate military command-and-control communications (Hafner and Lyon, 1996).

After governments and civilians' widespread adoption of the Internet, militaries began utilising it for secure communications, including capabilities for cyber warfare, as it became a part of defence infrastructure, such as the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command in 2009 (Kuehl, 2009).

While the internet's use for cyber defence, intelligence, and even offensive operations has become widespread, countries like the U.S., China, and Russia are leveraging cyberspace for cyber espionage and cyberattacks. The Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facilities shows the Internet's use in modern warfare (Zetter, 2015).             

Stuxnet Virus (Iranian Nuclear Facility Attack). Stuxnet malware, classified as a “worm”, targeted Siemens Industrial Control Systems (ICS) in an Iranian nuclear facility, by spinning out-of-control uranium enrichment centrifuges undetected (Langner, 2011). The strategic goal was to surreptitiously thwart Iran’s nuclear programme while avoiding retaliation and a major war due to the uncertainty of the attacker’s identity (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011). Notably, the worm was first discovered in 2010, but it was probably active in 2005 (Zetter, 2014).

This was the first significant use of cyberweapons against another country (Zetter, 2014), and while it did not stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions cold, it certainly would delay them for years to come. Once new internet usage was identified, such as a cyberattack involving a worm, other countries and non-state actors reverse-engineered the technology and utilised this cyber weapon to achieve their own objectives.

Drones Adapted for Military Operations. Drones, commonly known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), have existed since World War II, being used as remote-operated aircraft for collecting scientific measurements during nuclear bomb tests to protect personnel from radiation exposure (National Security Archive, 2016). However, the meaning of the term has evolved significantly over time. Today, it primarily refers to the modern uses of drones, which have incorporated technological advancements to face the changing needs of military operations.

It was after the USA was attacked on 9/11 that the Predator Drone became integral to the U.S. military and, in particular, to counterterrorism missions (Kreps and Kaag, 2012). Further advancements in technology, combined with the growth in manufacturing scale, made it easier and cheaper to deploy such equipment in the sky. This allows soldiers to engage targets from a distance, even in hostile environments, thereby minimising risk to personnel (Singer, 2009). Nevertheless, this technology could and has not supplemented “boots on the ground” and large scale operations, but rather complemented.

During the last decade, drones revolutionised warfare; they made it possible to target terrorists with precision strikes; however, there were ethical issues around civilian casualties and the rise of asymmetrical warfare (Boyle, 2020). In recent years, drones (e.g. kamikaze drones) began to complement precision targeting missiles, offering a cheap alternative (Molloy, 2024; Gogua, 2023; Zampronha and Albuquerque, 2024). On the other hand, the widespread availability of low-cost civilian drones (photography, deliveries, etc.) provided a cheap remote weapon for insurgents and militaries to use in conflict zones, as well as making it hard to trace despite the limited potential. For example, these were used as a tactic during conflicts, such as the Syrian Civil War and the conflict in Ukraine (Holleis and Albam, 2024; Zafra et al., 2024); one saw improvised explosive devices (IEDs) dropped from quadcopters onto enemy positions with razor-sharp accuracy. As a result, acquiring drones, even the low-cost variants, has become standard practice and is now part of many countries' military arsenals.

3D-Printed Firearms. Another technological breakthrough, the 3d printers, which provided a new perspective for creating spare parts, houses and even medical parts, has been identified as a potential threat to society. In some cases, people constructed working firearms by employing designs and printing commercially available printers (Ferguson, 2013). In 2013, the ‘Liberator’ was successfully fired, the first fully 3D-printed firearm (Greenberg, 2013). Considering that 3D printed guns or nowadays drone parts, can be untraceable and easy to produce (Barton and Brownlee, 2021), gun control and law enforcement are going to have a hard time. This problem gradually escalates with further advancements in this technology, allowing for mass and faster 3D printouts for offensive use operations. In November 2024, US police discovered 80 3d printed guns (ghost guns) (Local12, 2024).

GPS Technology in Warfare. In another case, the Global Positioning System (GPS) was intended for civilian navigation. Still, later, it was used in military applications for precision-guided munitions for high-precision military operations targeting (Rip and Lusch, 1994). The first extensive use of GPS-guided weapons occurred in the Gulf War in 1991 (Space and Missile Systems Center and SMC History Office, 2016). GPS provides precision that decreases collateral damage and boosts the level of airstrikes, but it also enhances the dependency on technology in conflict (Sharrett et al., 1992). There have been cases where ships’ GPS were jammed or affected, resulting in the off-course direction of the ship to non-safe waters (Grant, Paul Williams and Basker, 2009). Today, DGPS or GPS are used for military operations with other sensors and AI tools, allowing more precise identification of the course and the targets. Nevertheless, the system continues to exhibit susceptibility to manipulation, exemplified by the incident in November 2024, wherein North Korea disrupted the GPS services of South Korea, consequently impacting flights and maritime vessels (The Associated Press, 2024).

Social Media as a Weapon in Disinformation Campaigns. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter started to gain momentum with the emergence of smartphones, which significantly simplified the usage of these applications. People with very little or no skills in computers have been using social media ever since. However, because social media is an inexpensive and simple-to-use global platform, it is ideal for propaganda and psychological operations (Howard, 2015). Hence, both state and non-state actors are able to use platforms of disinformation that affect public opinion and cause a sense of division in target societies (Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, 2017). Social media weaponisation is creating losses in public trust in institutions, destabilising political systems and awareness about the necessity for digital regulation (Diresta, 2016). In the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, 2017) Russian operatives deliberately used these tactics.

Dual-Use Satellites. Another example comes from the satellite domain, where some originally civilian satellites for communication and weather monitoring have been repurposed for military surveillance and intelligence (Dolman, 2002). The idea of dual-use satellites originated during the Cold War and remains prominent until now (Moltz, 2019). Satellites' real-time intelligence on an adversary significantly enhances military planning and operations (Moltz, 2019). However, dual-purpose satellites, have blurred the lines between civilian and military space assets and added to the militarisation of space (Dolman, 2002).

Bombs from the supermarket. Lemieux et al. (2014) indicated that, in 2010, when ISIS and other extremist groups were moving away from centralised tactics and toward the inspiration of terrorist attacks from around the globe, their magazine, titled “Inspire”, first appeared (Lemieux et al., 2014). The aim was to inspire individual, radical lone-wolf attackers around the world not involved with ISIS to conduct attacks without being affiliated with any formal training by or direct contact with ISIS. It enabled ISIS to go further than conflict zones (Lemieux et al., 2014).

The magazine’s role was essential. It provided instructions for building such a bomb using everyday materials such as pressure cookers and chemicals to turn mundane civilian items into improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Such an incident is the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, where attackers were following instructions from Inspire, using pressure cooker bombs (Speckhard, 2013). The global threat of such instructions was demonstrated in an attack that killed three and injured hundreds.

Pagers as weapons. In October 2024, Israeli intelligence forces orchestrated a significant attack where they weaponised civilian communication devices and pagers, targeting Hezbollah members in Lebanon. Israeli operatives are presumed to have tampered with the pagers and detonated them remotely, killing or injuring key Hezbollah operatives. The attack follows a long string of Israel’s high-tech covert operations against Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups in the region (Gebeily, Pearson and Gauthier-Villars, 2024).

In a more precise context, the assault attributed to Hezbollah in 2024 focused on its communication network, which has depended on pagers since the 1990s as a low-tech substitute for the use of intercepted cellular phones. This reliance was prompted by previous offensive operations that had employed telephonic devices against them (Sky News, 2024). They thought that by using less traceable, simpler methods of communication, they would protect their operatives. However, low-tech solutions were not immune to Israel’s sophisticated intelligence efforts to track and manipulate the supply chain. The tactic hit hard at Hezbollah’s command structure (Gebeily, Pearson and Gauthier-Villars, 2024). The attack demonstrated how far Israel’s intelligence apparatus had gone to weaponise even something as simple as a communication device like pagers for assassination (Seibt, 2024).

According to reports, Israeli agents compromised the operation by creating fake online stores and pages to lure Hezbollah into buying the tampered pagers (Gebeily, Pearson and Gauthier-Villars, 2024). The attackers designed the devices to include concealed explosives that X-ray could not detect (Gebeily, Pearson and Gauthier-Villars, 2024). When these pagers detonated simultaneously in Lebanon, followed by a walkie-talkie attack, there were significant Hezbollah casualty numbers (Gritten, 2024; Sabbagh, Bayer and Milmo, 2024).

This operation signals a new era of warfare, characterised by technology and intelligence having a place of importance in statecraft and military strategy (Tlozek, 2024).

Future Trends and Impacts on Global Security

In addition to existing technologies, breakthroughs and emerging trends may increasingly militarise civilian technologies. The Internet of Things (IoT), the expanded utilization of drones (aerial, maritime, and subsurface), and the incorporation of Network Centric Warfare into the military capabilities of nations underscore the necessity for extensive data processing. In this context, artificial intelligence is positioned to play a crucial role in facilitating real-time military operations, as well as in conducting threat assessments mitigation.

The integration of autonomous systems, quantum computing, hypersonic technologies, as well as advancements in artificial intelligence and bioengineering, may facilitate an unpredictable evolution of the relationship between civilian and military technologies. Concurrently, the increasing accessibility and diminishing costs of these technologies could significantly alter this dynamic. This may also lead to partial or total abuse of the technology, resulting in potential disruptive consequences.

To comprehend prospective directions and potential innovations within the systemic environment, governance proposals could be formulated based upon historical data and future hypotheses. Adaptability, along with the capacity to anticipate potential challenges stemming from emerging civilian-military technologies, is imperative for effective governance.

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