is a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute (RSDI)
(July 29, 2024)
The Olympic Games represent the pinnacle of global sports, bringing together nations in a celebration of athleticism, competition, and cultural exchange. Every mega event, however, has to contend with security risks, and organizers of this year’s Olympics will face the formidable task of ensuring the safety of the thousands of athletes, fans, and dignitaries who will descend on Paris between July 26 and August 11, 2024.
The potential threats of such large-scale events run the gamut from international terrorism, and cyber threats to local petty crime, and public disorder and require the coordination of multiple security agencies and the mobilization of vast resources. The cost of security is one of the most significant expenses in hosting such events, often consuming a large portion of a city’s budget that might otherwise contribute to lasting community benefits.
Organizers must also find a balance between security measures that ensure safety but also maintain the open and hospitable environment crucial to the spirit of the event.[i] The integration of advanced security technologies raises concerns about privacy and civil liberties, particularly regarding mass surveillance and the restriction of movement, posing ethical dilemmas about the balance between safety and personal freedoms.[ii]
City of Lights, city of frights: Paris as a potential terrorist target
Paris carries historical significance as a target for terrorist attacks. Previous attacks by Islamic extremists in the capital have left a profound impact on the nation’s psyche. In January 2015, 12 people were killed in an attack on the offices of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. Just over 10 months later, radical Islamists coordinated three attacks and murdered 130 people, including 90 at a concert hall in Bataclan. These attacks demonstrated the ability of terrorists to strike at the heart of French society and highlighted the vulnerabilities within the country’s security infrastructure.[iii]
The global visibility of the Olympic Games also makes them a potential target for terrorist groups, both domestic and international. Organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda perceive France as a symbol of Western interventionism and could seek to retaliate against it.[iv] These terrorist organizations have publicly declared their hostility towards the Olympics host, who participated in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, supported fights against Islamist insurgents in African countries such as Mali, and intervened militarily in Iraq, Syria, and other Muslim-majority countries.
Since 2017, French authorities have foiled just under 40 smaller-scale terrorist plots, including a 2022 attempt in Strasbourg by IS-Khorasan. Dr. Marc Hecker, Deputy Director of the French Institute of International Relations, suggests extremists might look to locations outside of Paris as targets. “As has been the case in previous attacks, in the past 10 years, many attacks occurred in remote areas and smaller cities,” he says. “The purpose would be to drive home the point that attacks can happen anytime and anywhere.”[v]
The scenario of lone wolf attackers, inspired by extremist ideology and acting independently, is a distinct possibility given the prevalence of online radicalization and the decentralized nature of terrorist networks. While groups such as ISIS may seek to carry out large-scale attacks, lone actors could opt for smaller-scale, opportunistic attacks that require minimal planning and coordination.[vi]
Domestic unrest in France: Faster, stronger, louder?
Major sporting events have been used in the past as stages for political statements or disruptions. The current political climate, with wars taking place in Ukraine and Gaza and elections set for 49% of the world’s population, including both the United States and European Union, makes protest more likely, especially at an international event with wide media coverage, offering high visibility. While some of the staged political demonstrations might be peaceful, they can cause disruptions that might derail organizational timelines and transportation systems.
France has dealt with domestic unrest in recent years, posing a significant concern for the upcoming Olympic Games. Riots rocked Paris, for example, in June 2023, after the fatal shooting by police of 17-year-old Nahel Merzouk in the banlieue, or suburb, of Nanterre.[vii] High unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion are prevalent in these suburbs, and these conditions can create fertile ground for radicalization, especially among young people, who may feel marginalized from mainstream society. Extremists often target this demographic online.[viii]
The war in Gaza has resulted in protests against Israel worldwide. Police have responded to demonstrations in France with tear gas and water cannons, and a regional authority in Paris has cut off funding[ix] to one of its universities in response to what it called “anti-Semitic hatred.” As a result, Dr. Jeffrey Kaplan, a distinguished fellow at the Danube Institute in Hungary and an expert on terrorism, believes that Israeli athletes could be targeted at the Olympics. The Israeli delegation should be sequestered in a defensible location outside the Olympic village, he argues, and transportation routes to and from venues and the airport must be highly secure and unpredictable.[x]
The digital arena: Cyberthreats and the modern Games
The Paris 2024 Olympics and Paralympic Games are expected to attract four billion viewers, representing more than half of the world’s population. The sheer scale of the event, combined with its digital presence, make it an attractive target for cybercriminals, hacktivists, and state actors.
The potential cyber risks associated with the Games include data breaches, ransomware attacks, and the theft of personal data, which could lead to disrupted operations, blocked ticket sales, and compromised athlete data. The Paris Games will be held in a highly digitized environment, with access badges, surveillance, and broadcasting systems all susceptible to cybercrime.[xi]
Previous Olympic Games have experienced significant cybersecurity incidents. For example, the 2008 Beijing Olympics saw a sophisticated hacking operation called “Operation Shady Rat” that targeted government data, legal contracts, email archives, and more. The 2016 Rio Olympics were targeted by a group of Russian hackers known as “Fancy Bear” who gained illegal access to an International Olympic Committee account and leaked the private health data of 29 athletes.
French President Emmanuel Macron has said he is concerned about Russia targeting the Paris Olympics, given France’s support of Ukraine in the current war with Russia.[xii] Dr. Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy at the Skema Business School in Paris, agrees that “cyber threats, particularly from entities possibly linked to Russia,” are a major threat. “[I have] concerns about potential attacks on the digital infrastructure of the Games, which could lead to widespread disruption, erode public trust, and tarnish France's international reputation,” he says.[xiii]
A team effort: Coordinating security at the Olympics
French authorities will employ a multi-layered security strategy using an estimated 45,000 police officers and 10,000-20,000 military troops.[xiv] Securing the Olympics will require seamless coordination among various national and international security agencies, including local police, national guard units, and intelligence agencies. Aligning protocols, communication channels, and operational strategies is a complex challenge. French authorities have already requested assistance from 46 countries to provide additional police officers for the Games.
The private sector will also play a role in the security of the Olympics. The French government has vetted and hired approximately 20,000 private security personnel to supplement the police and military for the Games and its various side events.[xv] Authorities will also collaborate closely with private transportation companies and hotels to enhance security measures across the city and minimize vulnerabilities in areas adjacent to Olympic venues.
One of the most pressing challenges in securing the Olympic Games is managing the vast crowds that attend. Large gatherings increase the risk of stampedes, pickpocketing, and other public safety incidents. The security strategy will prioritize safe ingress and egress from venues, effective crowd control, and emergency response capabilities.[xvi] Physical security measures such as perimeter fencing, vehicle barriers, and security checkpoints will be essential for controlling access to Olympic venues and mitigating the risk of unauthorized entry. Specialized security forces, including counterterrorism units and bomb disposal teams, are likely to be stationed onsite to respond rapidly to any security incidents.
Securing stadiums, training facilities, and the Olympic Village will involve preventing unauthorized access and equipping the venues with necessary surveillance and emergency response systems. Enhanced intelligence gathering and information sharing with international partners will be used to identify and disrupt potential terrorist plots before they materialize. Advanced surveillance technologies, including closed-circuit television cameras, facial recognition systems, and drones, may be deployed to monitor crowds and detect suspicious behaviour.[xvii] Public awareness campaigns emphasizing vigilance and reporting suspicious activity can also empower citizens to play a role in maintaining security during the Games.[xviii]
Events such as the opening and closing ceremonies are meant to “develop harmony,” a core value of the Olympics.[xix] This year’s opening ceremony will present a unique security challenge, as it will be held along a six-kilometer stretch of the Seine River rather than in a stadium. The open, outdoor environment will present logistical challenges for security personnel, who are used to planning for enclosed spaces.[xx]
Macron has indicated that in the event of a security threat, the French government has a contingency plan in place. This plan could involve relocating the opening ceremony to the Stade de France, a national stadium located north of Paris, which offers a more controlled and secure environment. By having alternative venues and protocols in place, French authorities aim to ensure the safety and continuity of the event in the face of potential security risks.[xxi]
Conclusion
The Olympics has a history of terrorist attacks. At the 1972 Games in Munich Palestinian militants targeted the Israeli delegation at the Olympic Village, kidnapping nine and murdering two. A series of pipe bombs at an Olympic Park in Atlanta, killed one person and injured 111 others in 1996 Atlanta. These tragedies underscore the potential for terrorist groups or lone wolf actors to target the Paris Olympics this summer.
The sheer size of the event makes it a challenge to secure, but there are other factors that make Paris in 2024 a unique safety risk. A high visibility event in one of the world’s most iconic capitals make it a tempting target for terrorists and political activists, especially at a time of heightened tension both geopolitically and domestically. Cyberattacks are also a possibility, given that these Games will be one of the most digitized.
The French authorities have taken measures to deter attacks, but the complex security landscape and evolving threat environment require ongoing vigilance and preparedness to ensure a safe and secure event for all involved.
[i] Toohey, K., & Taylor, T. (2023). Mega events, fear, and risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games. In The Olympics (pp. 329-343). Routledge.
[ii] Jennings, Will and Lodge, Martin (2011) Governing mega-events: tools of security risk management for the London 2012 Olympic Games and FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany. Government and Opposition, 46 (2), 192-222. (doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01336.x).
[iii] Jouve, Shams and Saron M. Obia, ‘Analysing the Security of Mega Sporting Events in the 21st Century’, International Team for the Study of Security, Verona, July 16, 2022, https://www.itssverona.it/analysing-the-security-of-mega-sporting-events-in-the-21st-century
[iv] Roan, Dan, ‘Paris Olympics 2024: 'Unprecedented' security will be in place’, RNZ, April 17, 2024, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/sport/514511/paris-olympics-2024-unprecedented-security-will-be-in-place
[v] Interview with Dr Marc Hecker on May 14, 2024
[vi] Albertini, Antoine, ‘Terrorism remains the key challenge at the Paris 2024 Games’, Le Monde, March 6, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/03/06/terrorism-remains-the-key-challenge-at-the-paris-2024-games_6589983_7.html?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1709710661
[vii] Al Jazeera, ‘Mapping French protests triggered by the police killing of Nahel’, June 30, 2023, Mapping French protests triggered by the police killing of Nahel | Infographic News | Al Jazeera
[viii] The Economist, ‘Beware, global jihadists are back on the march’, April 29, 2024, https://www.economist.com/international/2024/04/29/beware-global-jihadists-are-back-on-the-march
[ix] Times of Israel, ‘Top French university loses regional funding over pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel protests’, April 30, 2024, Top French university loses regional funding over pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel protests | The Times of Israel
[x] Interview with Dr Jeffrey Kaplan on May 12, 2024
[xi] Barnes, Julian ‘France Bracing for Cyberattacks During Summer Olympics’, New York Times, April 8, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/08/us/politics/france-cyberattacks-summer-olympics.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap
[xii] Reuters, ‘Macron says he has no doubt Russia will target Paris Olympics’, April 4, 2024, Macron says he has no doubt Russia will target Paris Olympics | Reuters
[xiii] Interview with Dr Simon Chadwick on May 6, 2024
[xiv] Leicester, John, ‘France asks for foreign police and military help for Paris Olympics security’, PBS Newshour, March 29, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/france-asks-for-foreign-police-and-military-help-for-paris-olympics-security
[xv] Based on data provided in an interview with Dr Marc Hecker on May 14, 2024
[xvi] Based on an interview with Dr Marc Hecker on May 14, 2024
[xvii] Albertini, Antoine, ‘Paris 2024 Olympics: How will security be managed for this outsized event?’, Le Monde, April 3, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/01/03/2024-paris-olympics-how-will-security-be-managed-for-this-unprecedented-event_6010197_7.html
[xviii] Samuel, Henry, ‘Paris Olympics short of 8,000 security guards before opening ceremony’, The Telegraph, April 23, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/23/paris-olympics-short-8000-security-guards-for-events/
[xix] IOC, 'Olympic Values - Excellence, Respect and Friendship', Olympic values (olympics.com)
[xx] France 24, ‘Paris Olympics opening ceremony on the Seine could move for security reasons, says Macron’, April 15, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240415-paris-olympics-opening-ceremony-on-the-seine-could-move-for-security-reasons-says-macron
[xxi] Smith, Patrick, ‘Paris Olympics: France has a 'Plan B' for opening ceremony on the Seine if there's a security threat’, NBC News, April 15, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/sports/olympics/paris-olympics-plan-b-opening-ceremony-river-seine-security-threat-rcna147790
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The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.